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How to Try a Personal Injury Case
James Dooley*
P ROPER PRESENTATION of a case in court is dependent upon
proper preparation. Proper presentation means an intimate
knowledge of the facts, the parties, possible witnesses, and, of
course, the governing legal principles. Indeed, proper prepara-
tion means far more than knowledge. It embraces true compre-
hension.
Before an advocate can present his client's cause or meet
his adversary on equal terms, he himself must completely under-
stand the problem. Clear expression of an idea is impossible
without a clear understanding of it.
In the adversary climate of the courtroom, the importance
of a full comprehension of the matter of the litigation is par-
ticularly obvious when we consider the prime duty of the advo-
cate. It is not only to express thoughts. It is to convince others
that the ideas expressed not only are correct, but actually control
the issues to be determined. The subject matter, for example,
may involve the customs and practices followed in an industry,
or a mechanical or chemical problem, to say nothing of a par-
ticular physical condition.
True, a complete knowledge of any subject involves detail.
But, as we have noted, comprehension of the subject carries with
it an understanding. Understanding is arrived at through the
advocate's self-education. He must take this thorough knowledge
of the subject matter, place it in focus with his understanding
of the case, and cast out the unimportant. Only thus can the
advocate obtain his goal-simplicity. Any case is decided by
those who have but a passing experience with the facts. Wit-
nesses do not repeat themselves. Indeed, the importance of a fact
adduced on the first day of the trial may not be appreciated until
the last.
Simplicity means stripping the litigation so that the kingpins
are obvious. No matter how complex any lawsuit may be, its
outcome will be determined by one or two facts. These we like
to call the kingpins of the case. Choate referred to them as the
hub of the case. Thus effective presentation commences long
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before the case is called for trial. We were constrained to make
these remarks about preparation since only through proper prep-
aration can the case be properly presented.
In the very nature of things, one could dwell at length on
various phases of a trial. We shall comment upon a few. That
we have omitted to discuss certain aspects does not, of course,
mean that they are in no wise unimportant. Indeed, a trial is like
a chain-it is only as strong as its weakest link. One error can
be fatal. The tragic part is that we never know whether there
is error, and the import of it, until the jury's verdict. Hence
we look to experience for assistance.
It has been our experience that if there is any question con-
cerning the admissibility of evidence which can be resolved at
the outset, it is well to do so. The same may likewise be said
with reference to any particular trial mechanics, such as the
taking of notes by jurors in a protracted case.
For example, the remarriage of a widow neither bars nor
mitigates her pecuniary loss arising out of the death of her hus-
band. Indeed, in an opinion which collects these authorities,'
a court pointed out that a widow may frequently be much better
off after her husband's death than she had ever been in his
lifetime, or, on the other hand, she might be much worse off
pecuniarily by reason of her remarriage. Yet if it is brought to
the attention of the jury that the widow has remarried, even by
showing what her present name may be, the uniform effect has
been that the damages are diluted. The jurors, being human,
believe that she is no longer a widow and can hardly separate
her present condition from the fact that her cause of action
vested at the time of her husband's death.
We have encountered situations where the defendant states
that it has the right to know the present name of the widow,
notwithstanding that from such pretrial procedures as interroga-
tories and depositions it is well informed. Several judges have
stated they would allow this inquiry, but not in the presence of
the jury.
Again, your client may be a railroad employee who, since
the time of his injury, has retired and is drawing a pension pur-
suant to the provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act. Can the
jury be advised of the fact that he is receiving a pension? Al-
l City of Rome, 48 F. 2d 333 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
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though it was generally held that such was not admissible, 2 none-
theless on occasion it was held to be either non-prejudicial or
admissible for a limited purpose.3
The Supreme Court, in a case where the Circuit Court of
Appeals held that evidence of a pension received by a railroad
employee was admissible to show the reason for the plaintiff's
not returning to work, reversed the judgment on that sole
ground, holding that "evidence of collateral benefits is readily
subject to misuse by a jury." 4
Or assuming, as is frequently the situation, the injured has
received workmen's compensation benefits or the proceeds of
certain policies of accident insurance. It is, of course, well estab-
lished, as one court stated the rule, that "No injustice is done to
a person negligently injuring another in requiring him to pay
the full amount of damages for which he is legally liable without
deduction for compensation which the injured person may re-
ceive from another source which has no connection with the
negligence, whether that source is a claim for compensation
against his employer, a policy of insurance against accidents, a
life insurance policy, a benefit from a fraternal organization or a
gift from a friend." '
The courts realize that when the jury knows that plaintiff
has received some compensation benefits it is not inclined to
compensate the plaintiff for a loss which some other source might
have made good to a limited extent.'
Then too, a tort feasor is not entitled to profit from plaintiff's
foresight in providing himself with accident insurance.
7
Suppose the case will be protracted and there are multiple
parties. Would it not be worthwhile to have the jurors take
notes whenever they saw fit?
2 New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. Leary, 204 F. 2d 461, 468 (1st Cir. 1953),
cert. den'd. 346 U. S. 856 (1953); Sinovich v. Erie R.R., 230 F. 2d 658, 661
(3rd Cir. 1956); McCarthy v. Palmer, 113 F. 2d 721, 723 (2d Cir. 1940),
cert. den'd. 311 U. S. 680 (1940).
3 Page v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 312 F. 2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1963).
4 Eichel v. New York Central R.R., 375 U. S. 253 (1963).
5 O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry., 305 Ill. 244, 137 N.E. 214 (1922). See, Oleck,
Damages to Persons & Prop., Sec. 280 (1961 rev.).
6 Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 375 U. S. 34 (1963); O'Brien v. Chicago
City Ry., supra note 5; Burnett v. Hernandez, 263 F. 2d 212 (9th Cir. 1959);
Smith v. Majestic Iron Works, 2 N. Y. 2d 544, 161 N. Y. S. 2d 425 (1957).
7 Brynstesen v. Carroll Const. Co., 22 Ill. 2d 63, 174 N.E. 2d 172 (1961);
Montgomery v. Simon, 309 Ill. App. 516, 33 N.E. 2d 642 (1941); Consolidated
Coal v. Shepard, 112 Ill. App. 458 (1904).
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Where the question has arisen, courts have unanimously held
that it is entirely proper for jurors to take notes, either on their
own volition or upon motion of counsel, and have agreed that
the practice of taking notes is largely a matter of discretion.8 As
a reputable law journal noted,9 it would be inconsistent to permit
a trial judge to take notes of the evidence and to deny jurors the
right to this aid to their memory during deliberations. To deny
this right to the jury would mean that men are divided into two
groups mentally-those who have the benefit of notes and those
who, on the other hand, while obviously in greater need, are
denied this aid.
This is particularly helpful in a protracted trial or in one
wherein there are multiple plaintiffs with different elements of
damages. We believe that at the outset of any complex case this
question should be taken up with the Court and permission ob-
tained for the jurors to make what notes they desire.
Let us turn to the opening statement.
The opening statement makes the setting. There the advo-
cate creates the climate in which the facts will be presented and
the atmosphere in which they will be received. Of course, the
whole objective is to make that atmosphere as receptive as
possible.
An opening statement has perhaps less rules than any other
part of a trial. It is not argument. But it must not be made in
any fashion which indicates doubt or uncertainty. Through its
warp and woof there must be a certain subtle positiveness. This
can be accomplished only if one will utilize to the highest degree
possible the magic of the spoken word. Remember, the spoken
word is as different from the written word as a man is from his
portrait. The spoken word actually breathes. Call it inflection,
but nonetheless it has life.
Such expressions as "We expect the evidence to show" or
"We hope the evidence will show" do not add strength to your
opening statement. Why not merely state the facts as you expect
them to unfold from the evidence? If you display doubt, how
can you expect to convince others? Be certain, and yet not over-
certain. If there is an objection, of course it can be understood
that you are merely stating what the evidence will be.
8 154 A. L. R. 879; 89 C. J. S., Trial, 80; United States v. Campbell, 138 F.
Supp. 344 (N. D. Iowa 1956); United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479, 483(E. D. N. Y. 1940); Thornton v. Weaber, 380 Pa. 590, 112 A. 2d 344 (1955).
9 33 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 57, 58 (1949).
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Above all, keep in mind the purpose of the opening state-
ment. It is to acquaint twelve persons, completely unfamiliar
with the case, that which makes it-the facts. It is to give them
a kaleidoscopic view of that which is to come. Moreover, the
facts must be laid out so that the issues are understandable,
never forgetting that whatever is done in the trial of a lawsuit
should make for simplicity.
How, then, can this be done? We suppose every advocate
has his own particular way of accomplishing this objective. Re-
gardless of the method employed, the facts upon which you ex-
pect to obtain a verdict should be laid out. For illustration, let
us assume an injury case. Describe the scene so that all can
visualize it, using certain aids such as counsel table, the jury
rail, and anything which can make the matter simple. Fill in
with minutiae, such as the weather conditions. Drive home with
a certain amount of force the nature of the occurrence, so that
regardless of what may later come, the jury knows and are for
the cause you represent.
Tell what happened to your client subsequent to the occur-
rence, pointing out that a lawsuit is not composed solely of
pleasant facts, and that it is your duty to relate the unpleasant,
simply because it happens to be a part of that which makes the
case.
Then too, take the thunder out of your opponent's case.
This can be done by your description of the weaknesses in your
case. When you state those weaknesses, they do not appear as
such. When you leave it to your opponent, they are portrayed
as such.
These may be prior injuries, congenital conditions making
the plaintiff more susceptible to injury, or even a criminal record.
When you have disclosed what you know your adversary is de-
pending upon, how can there be fire to his side of the case?
Whenever you represent a plaintiff who has been convicted
of a crime which is competent to affect his credibility, you are
in a quandary. Does the defendant know about it? Assuming
the defendant knows about it, will he attempt to use it? You
may be certain that in almost all instances the defendant knows
if the plaintiff has a criminal record. However, in many instances
the defendant decides that it is not good judgment to make such
proof. If you have reason to believe that his criminal record
will not be gone into, then, of course, why should you mention
it? How you can tell whether your adversary will indulge in
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this evidence, we do not know, unless it may be in discussing
the merits of the case among yourselves, or at a pre-trial hearing.
Regardless of what anyone may say concerning the opening
statement, the test always remains the same. It is this: If the
jury were to then retire after the opening statement, would they
be compelled to return a verdict for the plaintiff? In other words,
your opening statement must be such as to convince the jurors
of the correctness of your position.
Nothing in a lawsuit is inflexible. This is best demonstrated
by the experience of a lawyer as related to us. It seems that the
plaintiff was seriously injured in a rear end collision. However,
there was about $10 damage to the plaintiff's automobile. In the
first trial he described the occurrence and also, for approximately
thirty minutes, the disabilities as a result of the ruptured cervical
disc. Defendant, on the contrary, concentrated on the amount of
damage to the car. The verdict was for the defendant.
Before the retrial, however, plaintiff had been operated upon
for the cervical disc and his condition had grown far worse. His
counsel's opening statement at the retrial ran thus: "My client
was stopped at a light. The defendant ran into him and he sus-
tained injuries." Defendant's counsel, who was prepared to
again laugh plaintiff out of court by comparing the damage to the
automobile with the alleged injury, was thus deflated. Plaintiff
was successful on a retrial and obtained a very substantial ver-
dict.
The greatest legal pitfall involved in the opening statement
is admissions inadvertently made by the advocate. Where def-
inite, unqualified admissions are made in the opening statement,
they can well be binding and be classified as admitted facts.
Thus where respective counsel for defendants admitted in their
opening statements their clients were operating the vehicles in-
volved in the occurrence, and the plaintiff failed to make proof
of such facts, the defendants were estopped on appeal from
asserting want of proof of their involvement.'0 Again, where the
defendant admitted in his opening statement that a loan had been
made, he was foreclosed from arguing lack of proof of this fact
on a motion to direct a verdict." Remember, the power of the
1D Peterson v. General Rug & Carpet Cleaners, Inc., 333 111. App. 47, 77 N.E.
2d 58 (1947).
11 Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Gregg, 32 F. 2d 567 (6th Cir. 1929).
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court to act upon facts conceded by counsel is as plain as its
power to act upon evidence produced.
12
Some ask whether an opening statement should be made.
Whenever one represents the party having the affirmative of the
issue, an opening statement should always be made. After all,
you are there to obtain some affirmative action by a jury. We
can well appreciate that an opening statement, from the defense
aspect, may do nothing other than to educate the plaintiff and
his attorney as to defendant's theory. If defendant believes an
opening statement will not aid it, it should not, in our opinion,
simply waive the opening statement. On the contrary, he should
make a very brief one. This may be in substance a suggestion
to the jury that they closely follow the evidence and after they
have heard all the evidence and the instructions of the Court
they will appreciate the correctness of the defendant's position.
What about the witnesses, or the actors in this drama?
Should reference be made to them in an opening statement? We
believe that only in exceptional cases should the witnesses be
described. It is only too often that after further consultation with
the witness, you believe that he may not be of aid to you. Thus,
you do not call him. However, if you have named him and de-
scribed in detail what he will testify to, you, of course, are sub-
jecting yourself to exposure in closing arguments.
Again, even before the opening statement and always before
the presentation of evidence, be certain to obtain a ruling exclud-
ing witnesses. The very objective is to aid in the discovery of
truth. Witnesses who listen to others testify are inclined to
adopt as their own the testimony of another. Then too, the
cross-examination of a witness who has listened to the cross-
examination of others is more difficult. The witness has been
"prepared" by hearing the cross-examination of another. In a
word, presence of witnesses takes from the trial that spon-
taneity characteristic of the individual witness.
The opening statement in this drama has been completed.
In what order should the witnesses be called? The order of
appearance is very important. Generally speaking, we believe
the opening statement itself fixes the order in which the proof
will be adduced. A pattern should be adopted and adhered to.
When considering the order of proof, always be conscious never
to overtry your case, to present so many witnesses about un-
12 Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, 263 (1880).
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necessary details that the "jugular vein" of the litigation is
hidden. Again, remember that in the presentation of the plain-
tiff's case, your evidence is being constantly criticized through
objection and cross-examination. The result is that usually your
case will be much stronger at the close of all the evidence than
at the close of the plaintiff's case. Why? Simply because de-
fendant's evidence has corroborated many of plaintiff's con-
tentions.
Proof of the situs in a personal injury case should be first.
This makes it possible for the jury to understand the subsequent
testimony of witnesses. Then too, references to landmarks have
some meaning for them.
We agree there are certain pro forma witnesses, such as
hospital record librarians, who can be called at any time. How-
ever, after you have made proof of your situs, whether it be by
plats or photographs, the first witness on any controverted mat-
ters should be your best. He marks your case. He is in a po-
sition to create that very important first impression. He can give
the jury an opinion of the righteousness of your cause that your
adversary cannot overcome. If, on the other hand, he is im-
peached or makes a poor impression, you have an uphill problem.
Many say-and we subscribe to this belief-that your last
witness should be your second best witness. But in how many
cases do you find yourself dealt such a hand? We shall be happy
to settle for one important, unimpeached witness who makes a
good impression.
What about the plaintiff? Never put him on at the outset
of the case. At that time, there are many facts in controversy.
As you proceed with your proof, there will be confessions of
fact. Again, at this particular stage, the jury does not know what
he has undergone physically. The cross-examiner can subject
him to harsher questioning than he would undertake when his
condition had been demonstrated and the jury and himself had
become fully aware of it.
There is another reason. At the early stages of the trial,
every weakness in your case will be brought out on the cross-
examination of the plaintiff. There will be no evidence of ex-
tenuating circumstances. For illustrative purposes, assume it is
a situation wherein the custom and practice is to violate a cer-
tain company rule. Evidence of customary disregard of a rule
Sept., 1966
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is, of course, admissible.' 3 If proof is made of the custom after
the plaintiff has testified, it might appear as an effort to cover
some vulnerable area.
Then too, if the plaintiff is presented in the early stages, you
will have the climax of the drama reached in the first scene.
What I mean is best demonstrated by a particular case. Let us
consider it.
The plaintiff's injury was loss of memory, without objective
symptoms of any consequence. It was apparently a case of hys-
teria. He had been injured while doing his work as a switchman,
and after the occurrence worked a couple of hours. He got into
his automobile and, instead of going home, drove to another town.
He was driving around the streets of the town aimlessly when he
saw a police car and asked where he was. He was taken to a
hospital, where many tests were performed upon him, but
nothing objective found, other than a few bruises. It was a rather
pathetic situation. He was married and the father of three chil-
dren. He likewise had certain skills, such as that of a carpenter.
He did not know his wife, nor did he recognize any of his chil-
dren. Moreover, he had, in large measure, forgotten the skills
of the carpenter.
At the time of the trial, he appeared healthy. He acted
normally.
As the trial progressed, it did so in his absence, primarily
because of a desire not to embarrass him with testimony con-
cerning his prior and subsequent condition. Day passed after
day. Witness after witness described his conduct before and
after the occurrence, showing his complete loss of memory.
Eventually, the court attaches themselves were asking if the
plaintiff was coming to court.
Finally, when on the ninth day he appeared and testified,
the jury was intense. Indeed, when he took the stand, the breath-
ing in the courtroom could be heard. Astute counsel on the
other side handled him gently. Do you think that if this normal-
appearing person had come on the scene at the outset, he would
have been accorded this reception? Of course not. But the jury
had listened to various descriptions of his handicaps and greeted
him as one of mankind's less fortunate. Again, had he appeared
early on the scene, the memory of the jury when it received the
case would not be as fresh.
13 Doering v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 196 Ill. App. 129 (1916).
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1966
15 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
This, we hope, establishes our belief that the plaintiff's ap-
pearance on the stand should, in cases of any consequence, be
brief and near the end of his case.
Should you have the plaintiff in the courtroom during the
selection of the jury or during the presentation of the evidence?
All of you have known jurors who excuse themselves when
defense attorneys examine them on the question of sympathy.
They look at the plaintiff. They consider the question. They
have a natural feeling for an injured person, as any human being
would. They feel that because they have this natural feeling they
cannot serve, when of course, the sympathy which disqualifies
them must be sympathy which would make it impossible for
them to return a verdict on the evidence and the law. More
than that, you will find conscientious persons disqualifying them-
selves as jurors. Certainly, both plaintiff and defendant want
conscientious jurors. The loss of such is a loss to both plaintiff
and defendant. As a matter of fact, it is our firm opinion that
the plaintiff should not be present during the trial, except to
testify. The less time the jury has to scrutinize the plaintiff
and his movements, the better off he is.
Jurors watch the plaintiff. They watch him more than any-
one in the courtroom. They become familiar with his movements,
how he stands up at a recess, his gait as he walks into the corri-
dor, and many other characteristics which may leave a definite
impression as to the nature of his injury.
When the plaintiff comes to court, he makes a clean appear-
ance. He usually looks fairly good, no matter how seriously
he may be injured. Suppose he has had a bad back injury. This,
of course, is not obvious, but if he is to sit for several hours on
the hard benches of the courtroom, that may have meaning for
a juror.
How many times have you become frozen in your chair
when defense counsel has argued to the jury that this man
could not be so seriously hurt because he remained seated for
two or two and one-half hours at a time, and because he has
gotten up in a normal way and walked in an apparently normal
way about the courtroom? That can be a very effective argu-
ment. Do not give the opposition that opportunity.
Suppose the plaintiff wants to know how his case is being
presented. And, of course, he ought to. Tell him to send his
wife or a friend in whom he has confidence to sit in the court-
Sept., 1966
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room during the trial and report to him how the case proceeds.
In this drama of the law, who will be the actors? The ex-
perienced advocate recognizes that his cast, composed of wit-
nesses, is very, very important. We have heard it said that a
plaintiff should call all witnesses who have any knowledge what-
soever about the matters in issue, regardless of how damaging
some might be, or how cumulative the proceedings will be. With
this thinking, we are in thorough disagreement. Why call some-
one to hurt your cause? It is much like presenting the other
side for one's adversary.
Unless a witness is necessary, do not call him. Each time
you place a witness on the stand, you afford your opponent the
opportunity of penetrating your case. The witness may be im-
peached. The witness may develop contradiction in the testimony
of other witnesses. The witness may establish the defense. Re-
member, many matters are proper on cross-examination which
could not be gone into on direct examination.
What, then, shall we use as guidelines to determine what
witnesses are to be employed? Is the witness one who is neces-
sary to prove a fact? If he is not, do not call him. Is the witness
one who, on cross-examination, will fortify the defendant's case?
If so, do not call him. Is the witness one who has given a signed
statement or a court reporter's statement, the contents of which
he does not recall? If so, do not call him unless absolutely
necessary. It cannot be stressed too much that there is nothing
that damages a case more than the impeachment of a witness. It
stigmatizes a case as false.
Whenever there is a possible choice of witnesses, select only
those who can answer questions intelligently, make a good im-
pression, and will not be impeached. A good witness must be
like Caesar's wife-above reproach. We believe in this even
though it may mean not using certain eye witnesses.
The examination of witnesses has always interested us.
There seems to be a general tendency on the part of a lawyer
to make himself the witness. Most questions asked on direct
examination are too cumbersome. Many are in the nature of
statements which the witness is asked to confirm. This, perhaps,
is the result of enthusiasm.
The function of the advocate is impersonal. Thus, be im-
personal in the examination of the witness. Seek to have the
attention of the jury focused on the witness and what he has
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1966
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to say. Always remember that the witness is to overshadow
the interrogator.
Simple examinations are the best. Introduce him. This
means his age, employment record and residence record, and his
ties of friendship or relationship with any of the parties. Then
move on to what the witness knows. Have him tell it, not blurt
it out, since in your preparation you have advised him of the
type of questions you will ask, so that his knowledge will not be
lost in a single answer. After you have obtained from him what
he knows, stop. Never try to get more out of the witness than
you know he knows.
In all lawsuits there are different types of witnesses. We
wish to call your attention to the witness we like to refer to as
the forgotten man. We mean the lay witness. What can he
testify to? He may express his opinion as to the physical con-
dition of the person observed. He may state whether, in his
opinion, such persons are in good health, have the ability to per-
form work, whether they are suffering pain, are conscious or
unconscious, in possession of mental faculty, have testamentary
capacity, and a host of other matters which would appear at first
blush to be conclusions. They are, of course, in fact, conclusions.
But, in the very nature of the law of evidence, many conclusions
are admissible.
As one Court quoted: 14
"It has also been held that witnesses who are not experts may
express their opinions as to the physical condition of per-
sons whom they have observed,-that is, they may state
whether, in their opinion, such persons are in good health,
have the ability to perform work, whether they are suffering
pain, are conscious or unconscious, in possession of their
14 Lauth v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 244 Ill. 244, 91 N.E. 431 (1910) cit-
ing Greinke v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 234 Ill. 564, 85 N.E. 327 (1908). The
general rule applied to such testimony is stated in 20 Am. Jur., "Evidence"
Sec. 823 as follows: "The emotions displayed by a person furnish an apt
illustration of the necessity and value of non-expert opinion evidence; for
it is practically impossible to describe another's appearance in such manner
as to convey to the jury an actual picture of the emotion manifested by him
at a given time. Human emotions and human passions are not, in them-
selves, physical entities susceptible of proof, as such, for they are seen only
in the effects they produce. By necessity, therefore, the existence or ab-
sence of the emotions of fear, anger, joy, excitement, nervousness, * * * and
the mental state of a person may be proved by opinions of non-experts as
deduced from the appearances and conduct observed by the witness * * *
All these emotions are expressed to the observer by appearances of the
countenance, the eye, and the general manner and bearing of the individual
which he cannot otherwise communicate except by an impression of re-
sults in the shape of an opinion."
Sept., 1966
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mental faculties, etc. (Citing cases) * * * Nor will he [the
injured party] be presumed to feign disease, pain or distress
under those conditions in which he is ordinarily observed by
strangers or his friends and neighbors."
Adopting the rule laid down in another decision, the Court,
after discussing the case in question, stated:
It was proper to prove his condition by persons who had
observed his physical condition, demeanor and conversation
through the years both before and after the time of the in-
jury, and to show by them what, if any, change they ob-
served in him after he received the injury.
The lay witness is particularly effective in cases where there
is a dispute as to the causal relationship between the injury and
the condition of ill being. You show: First, the man's prior ac-
tivities and apparent good health; second, the injury; and thirdly,
the effects which have taken place in him from the time of the
injury.
When the case is cast in such posture, it becomes difficult
indeed for the opposition.
All men believe that for every effect there must be some
cause. In our experience, where the contention is that the par-
ticular occurrence was not the cause of the condition of ill being,
lay witnesses have proved it even more effectively than medical
testimony.
What lay witnesses should you call? Their selection de-
termines the significance of their evidence. Whenever possible,
avoid relatives, members of the family or close friends. Instead,
call those who have no interest in the outcome of the case. In
this category, you find school teachers, merchants, fellow em-
ployees, and other similarly related parties.
There is another reason for the use of lay witnesses. This
is a vehicle of proving plaintiff's disability, including his suffer-
ing. None of us enjoys listening to the complaints of another.
A bore has been defined as a person who, when asked how he
feels, tells you the truth. All of us have had the experience of
actually shuddering before we ask a plaintiff, "How do you
feel?" We know that in some instances that simple question
would produce a torrent of words for seven or eight minutes.
Thus, whenever possible, avoid having the plaintiff himself
describe in detail his own complaints.
Those conditions can be proved by lay witnesses and also
through the subjective symptoms given by a treating doctor. It
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is possible to prove all the disabilities of the plaintiff without his
having uttered a single word about them. For example, an
elderly man had lost two legs and one arm while alighting from
a suburban train.15 When asked by the defense how he felt, he
merely smiled and said, "Fine." He did not have a single com-
plaint other than that he did not like the wheelchair. The impact
upon the jury of his attitude is such that he gained their respect
and admiration. Had he sought their pity, they, no doubt, would
have felt sorry for him. But pity is not such a moving force as
are respect and admiration. These emotions actually move others
to favorable acts.
When you present the plaintiff, you thus will not be pre-
senting him in the role of a complainer. Then too, it will abbre-
viate the direct examination. An intelligent cross-examiner will
also be brief. If he elects to go into the man's disabilities, it is
the cross-examiner rather than the plaintiff who is responsible
for this description by the plaintiff. It is the cross-examiner who
is creating the unpleasant climate. But, there is more. By the
time the plaintiff has taken the stand, the jury knows his con-
dition. It may be a very severe one.
Medical presentation likewise presumes proper preparation.
This includes a conference with the doctor. At that conference,
all medical records, including hospital records, should be avail-
able. If the doctor is to be an effective witness, he must be
refreshed as to what was found and done. Thus, he should fa-
miliarize himself with his records, as well as those of the hospital.
It will bring back to his mind this particular case. After a patient
has been discharged, the doctor is concerned with other problems
and thus must renew his knowledge of this particular case.
It has been our experience that there is no intelligent doctor
who cannot be a good witness, if some time is spent with him.
He should be advised of the problem at hand. That problem is
to have him describe the injury and all its aspects so that those
who have but a single encounter with it may understand it. He
should know the necessity of simplicity. Simplicity usually
means being illustrative and graphic. Above all, it means under-
standable language.
Proper preparation of the medical witness includes the form
of questions which he will be called upon to respond to. He must
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know that if he is asked as to whether he has an opinion upon a
given subject, he must answer either yes or no. He must be told
that after stating that he has an opinion on the subject, he will
be given an opportunity to express that opinion. It is to be
noted that in expressing an opinion, he should be educated in
the language of the law, so to speak. In those jurisdictions where
a witness can express an opinion on the ultimate issues to be de-
cided by a jury, he will state that a given condition is the result
of a given injury. In other jurisdictions he might be permitted
only to state that a given condition could or might have resulted
from the injury or that the injury was sufficient from a medical
point of view to cause the given condition. He must, in a word,
know that he must follow the language of the question. Thus, in
a jurisdiction such as Illinois, his answer would be, "My opinion
is that this particular condition could or might be caused by an
injury," not that it was brought about by the injury.
If the doctor is so educated, many objections and motions to
strike his testimony will be obviated and the jury will have a
running account of the witness's evidence without a multitude of
distractions which only serve to dilute expert evidence.
And, of course, the medical expert should know the question
upon which he will be called upon to express an opinion. This
can assume many shapes.
In those jurisdictions where the "could or might" rule is in
effect, the witness can be asked whether or not, in his opinion,
the condition could be caused by an injury, referring, of course,
to no specific injury or occurrence.' 6 One court wisely pointed
out that such a question is not an invasion of the province of the
jury because the question does not refer to the specific occur-
rence, but is directed at the character of the injury.
Then too, what about indirect as distinguished from direct
violence causing the injury? That is a proper subject of in-
terrogation.1
7
Many of us overlook proof of the painfulness of the con-
ditions by the doctor. We are prone to rely solely on the plaintiff.
Why not ask the doctor if the condition, as such, in his opinion,
can cause pain?' 8 He can describe what physical condition
16 See Walsh v. Chicago Rys. Co., 303 Ill. 339, 135 N.E. 709 (1922).
17 Ryan v. City of Chicago, 181 Ill. App. 642 (1913).
18 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Martin, 112 Ill. 16, 1 N.E. 111 (1884).
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caused the injured to have these complaints. His testimony will
not only be explanatory but corroborative of the plaintiff.
Nor should we overlook making inquiry of the doctor as to
whether this condition is one which is reasonably certain to
cause pain in the future. This, of course, is proper.19 Then too, it
affords an evidentiary basis for the damage instruction listing
future pain and suffering as one of the elements to be considered
in fixing the award.
Frequently we encounter situations where there is an in-
ference that the injured is a malingerer. This is usually injected
into the case in a subtle way by the employment of innuendoes.
When such is inferred, why not meet the innuendo head on and
bring it out into the open? What better way is there than to ask
the attending doctor whether, in his opinion, the injured is feign-
ing or falsifying his complaints? This specific question, "Was he
feigning them [his complaints] or making believe?" was held
proper in a given case.
20
What about permanency? Everyone knows the simple ques-
tion can be asked of any doctor whether or not the condition is
temporary or permanent. 21 However, x-rays also demonstrate
many conditions of a permanent character. Why not ask the doc-
tor, when the x-rays are being interpreted by him when he is
describing certain abnormalities, as to whether they are, in his
opinion, temporary or permanent? Through this mode of ex-
amination there can be brought out the multiple facets of the
permanency of the injury.
So also is it recognized that congenital conditions which ren-
der the plaintiff more susceptible to injury or require an unusual
time in healing are a proper matter of inquiry. 22
What about future conditions? Can the medical witness
establish it? This is a rather delicate field. Unless the advocate
is careful, he will be vulnerable to the charge of calling for
speculative testimony. This is a phase of the examination which
requires preparation and foresight as well as the developmental
technique. In many cases, medical science knows rather spe-
cifically what effects are reasonably certain to follow. In more
cases it does not. Nevertheless, the right to make inquiry on this
19 Lauth v. Chicago Union Traction Co., supra note 14.
20 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Martin, supra note 18.
21 Metz v. Yellow Cab Co., 248 Ill. App. 609 (1928).
22 Cooney v. Hughes, 310 111. App. 371, 34 N.E. 2d 566 (1941).
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subject exists, limited, of course, by the rule against speculative
testimony.
Free from difficulty are matters concerning whether the con-
dition is progressive or static. An opinion can well be based upon
the condition as observed, or as known in medicine. Moreover,
consequences reasonably certain to follow, in his opinion, can be
testified to.23
How is the doctor's opinion elicited? As a rule of thumb,
if every request for an opinion is prefaced with this expression,
"Do you have an opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of
medical and surgical certainty," you will be on solid ground.
Except in unusual instances, such a preface will remove your
question from the category of the speculative. The witness is
giving his opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of medical
and surgical certainty.
Then too, doctors are frequently asked for their opinions,
but not for the reason for that opinion. An opinion without the
reason for it is usually meaningless. Without the witness's
reason for his opinion, the juror is not given an opportunity to
accept or reject the opinion. Why not ask for reasons? The
witness can dilate and simplify his position so that all can not
only understand, but be convinced. Indeed, such a question gives
the witness an opportunity to make an argument on behalf of
his opinion. And remember, doctors, like everyone else, are pro-
tagonists when it comes to opinions.
Interestingly enough, it has been held reversible error for
a court to refuse to allow a doctor to give the reasons for his
opinion, a fact of which many trial judges are not aware.2 4 As a
matter of fact, courts have frequently commented upon naked
opinions which are not supported by the witness's reasons or by
supporting facts.25
If the doctor is to make a good presentation, he should know
what he may anticipate on cross-examination, a matter which
almost all medical witnesses worry about.
Methods of cross-examining a medical witness where there
is a real injury fall into but a few categories.
First, there is the flattery approach: "Now, doctor, you did
everything you could for this man, didn't you?" And the doctor,
23 Lauth v. Chicago Union Traction Co., supra note 14.
24 Quincy Gas & Electric Co. v. Schmitt, 123 Ill. App. 647 (1907).
25 People v. Faber, 199 N. Y. 256, 92 N.E. 674 (1910).
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having on his mind a possible malpractice case, naturally says,
"Yes." And, "Doctor, there isn't anything that any other doctor
could do?" and the doctor naturally says, "No."
Finally, after a series of such questions, the doctor is asked,
"Doctor, because of the excellent way you treated this man, there
was a good result, wasn't there?" Then the doctor, no matter
how permanently injured the man is, is placed in a quandary.
If he says he obtained a bad result, he might be admitting that
he was guilty of malpractice. So it is easier to say, "Yes," and
that is what he usually says, unless he is properly prepared.
Then there is the "other causes" approach to cross-examina-
tion: "Now, Doctor, what are the other causes of this condition?"
The doctor admits there are causes. The doctor admits that
people who have never been in an accident have suffered from
this condition. He further admits that people may be born with
it. Indeed, the cross-examiner usually runs the gauntlet of "other
causes."
But if the doctor knows there is to be a redirect examination,
he won't be worrying when he says "yes" to these other causes.
He will know that on redirect examination you will cover every
cause the examiner alluded to and exclude all except the injury
in question.
Another misconception prevalent among the medical profes-
sion is that it is almost sinful for a doctor to state that he relied
upon what the patient told him. Yet that is the method by which
medicine is practiced day in and day out throughout the world.
The first thing any doctor asks the patient when he comes in is,
"How do you feel?"
Disabuse the doctor of the idea that he needs to fear stating
that he relied upon subjective symptoms.
Another field which, although touched upon, is not used to
its fullest extent is expert testimony. Whenever there is the
possibility of the use of an expert, do not overlook it. An expert
can explain your case, translate theory into plain, understandable
language so that the jurors fully comprehend it. More than that,
an expert can, in fact, make your case. Thus, consider this situa-
tion: A car repairman working on a railroad car in the yards
fell from a wooden straw horse. On the face of it, it does not
seem there could be any negligence. However, it was developed
that other railroads used different and safer methods. This testi-
mony came through that of employees familiar with the practices
Sept., 1966
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in the industry.20 They were as much experts as he who had a
Ph.D. degree.
Expert testimony is admissible when the subject matter of
the inquiry is of such a character that only persons of skill,
experience and knowledge on the subject are capable of forming
a correct judgment as to facts connected therewith. Expert evi-
dence is not confined to particular classes or professions, but is
admissible whenever the witnesses offered as experts have pe-
culiar knowledge or experience which is not common to the
world, and which renders their opinions, founded upon such
knowledge and experience, an aid to the jury in determining the
questions at issue.27
In such regard, it is well settled that persons specially quali-
fied by skill or experience may state expert opinion as to scien-
tific matters, as to the management and operation of vehicles,
machinery, railroads, and other appliances, and as to matters of
custom and usage in business.2
There is nothing new about expert testimony. In 1874 it was
held reversible error to exclude the testimony of a witness as to
why, in his opinion, an emery stone had broken.29
Eighty-one years later, it was held proper for an industrial
engineer to express his opinion that a grinding wheel had burst
because of a lack of uniformity in its structure.30
Likewise, an expert has been permitted to testify that if
metal had been properly fused it would not separate and to ex-
press an opinion that a chisel had broken because it was im-
properly welded. 31
The gauntlet of expert testimony is indeed a long one. In
one case an architect was permitted to testify that a plank, being
used as a pry, would break at a weight of 3,971 pounds.32 Where
a floor had collapsed while in the process of being jacked up,
26 Margevich v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 1 Ill. App. 2d 162, 116 N.E. 2d 914
(1953), cert. den'd. 348 U. S. 861 (1954).
27 Thompson v. Hughes, 286 Ill. 128, 121 N.E. 387 (1918); People v. Jennings,
252 Ill. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911); Hays v. Place, 350 Ill. App. 504, 113 N.E.
2d 178 (1953); 18 I.L.P., Evidence, Sec. 321.
28 32 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 533; 18 I. L. P., Evidence, Secs. 323, 325; 47 Ill.
Bar J. 604 (1959).
29 Camp Point Mfg. Co. v. Ballou, 71 Iii. 417, 422 (1897).
30 Brown v. Sterling Abrasives Division, 5 Ill. App. 2d 1, 124 N.E. 2d 607
(1955).
31 Pfeifer v. Eastern Metal Works, 258 111. 427, 101 N.E. 548 (1913).
32 Devine v. Mathis Bros. Co., 160 Ill. App. 122 (1911).
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on the basis of the appearance after the accident testimony was
permitted that one of the jacks had buckled and cracked a
block. 33 What caused a pipe to explode was permitted to be told
by a machinist, 34 and, in the same vein, steam fitters were per-
mitted to state their opinion as to the breaking of a steam pipe.35
On another front, a university professor who had never seen
or participated in the manufacture of wire rope and was not
completely familiar with the manufacturing process, on the basis
of his education as a doctor of mechanical engineering, expressed
an opinion that a wire cable had broken because of improper
manufacture. 36 Indeed, even the cause of a cargo falling while a
whip was being unloaded was permitted to be stated by an ex-
perienced marine surveyor and superintendent.37
In the field of railroading, expert testimony has probably
been employed almost as long as various other fields of human
endeavor. Witness a railroad man giving his opinion as to the
custom of well regulated railroads to place telltales on each side
of low overhead bridges,38 or a railroad man expressing his
opinion as to the degree of curve requiring a guard rail,39 or an
engineer testifying whether a grade siding should have been
equipped with a derailing switch.40 In the same field is evidence
of what other railroads usually and customarily do, with ref-
erence to safer methods41 and safe place to work, 42 or warning
employees about the dangers of creosote. 43
Expert testimony can be of aid on the measure of damages.
There is the banker who can testify as to the highest rate at
which money can safely be invested. His testimony can be of im-
portance at such a time as the present high interest rates. He will
be the first to agree that in computing interest over a life span,
a more conservative figure than that being paid by the banks as
33 Moss v. Williams, 143 Ill. App. 140 (1908), aff'd 237 IIl. 254 (1909).
34 McCabe v. Swift & Co., 143 Ill. App. 404 (1908).
35 Webster Mfg. Co. v. Mulvanny, 168 Ill. 311, 48 N.E. 168 (1897).
36 Sitta v. American Steel & Wire Division of U. S. S., 254 F. 2d 12 (6th Cir.
1958).
37 Curtis v. Garcia y Cia, 272 F. 2d 235 (3rd Cir. 1959).
38 Pittsburgh, S. & N. R. Co. v. Lamphere, 137 F. 20 (3rd Cir. 1905).
39 Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Gillespie, 224 F. 316 (4th Cir. 1915).
40 Troxell v. Del., L. & W. R. Co., 180 F. 871 (E. D. Pa., 1910).
41 Margevich v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., supra note 26.
42 Gila Valley Ry. v. Lyon, 203 U. S. 465 (1906).
43 Dowler v. N. Y. C. & St. L. R.R., 5 IMI. 2d 125, 125 N.E. 2d 41 (1955).
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interest on deposits should be used. The reason is simply that
interest rates fluctuate and in a year hence we might be in a low
interest rate period.
All of us have met the actuary, usually called by the defend-
ant, who, employing the highest interest rate at which money can
be safely invested, reduces to its present value a given sum over
a period of years. We are constrained to note that there is no
authority for a position frequently taken by defendants in death
cases that in computing present value, work expectancy tables,
as distinguished from life tables, should be employed. The only
proper evidence is a recognized life table. It then becomes a
matter for the jury to determine, under the instructions, how
long a person of the age of the plaintiff, having his habits, might
have worked.44 This is true even though there might be a com-
pulsory retirement age, since persons who are forced to retire
from a given occupation subsequently obtain other employment.
Thus we say this is for the jury to decide, depending upon the
habits of industry of the person involved.
Inflation, courts of review tell us, in considering whether a
verdict is excessive, is a matter of judicial notice. Why not make
proof of the actual facts of inflation? It will not only enlighten
the court of review, but, more important, the jury. Whenever a
person is permanently injured or wherever there is a death, such
testimony can be of untold aid. Remember, the persons who
suffer from inflation most are those who have to depend upon
fixed incomes. Wages are raised with the cost of living. Not so
in the case of the fixed income.
Thus, consider a death action under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. The measure of damages, for the most part, is a
loss of contributions. Usually the value of such intangibles as the
loss of guidance to children,45 the services which the deceased
may have performed about the home,46 and the loss of the right
to inheritance 46a are overlooked. On the contrary, each life is
thought to have a mathematical value, omitting the human equa-
tions. Evidence of a continuous inflationary spiral during the last
44 Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 Il. 2d 164, 133 N.E. 2d 288 (1956) cert.
den'd. 352 U. S. 833 (1956); contra: Wetherbee v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 191 F.
2d 302 (7th Cir. 1951).
45 Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Holbrook, 235 U. S. 625 (1915); Giles v. Great
Western Ry., 72 F. Supp. 493 (D. C. Minn. 1947).
46 Michigan Central Ry. Co. v. Veerland, 227 U. S. 59 (1913).
46a Martin v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 268 F. 2d 397 (5th Cir. 1959).
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twenty-five years and one which, in the consensus of economists,
is expected to continue, can do much to knock out these math-
ematical values and at the same time make possible a true con-
sideration of all the elements of damages 47 in an action of this
character.
The hypothetical question is a great weapon in the use of
expert testimony. It takes all the legs, so to speak, by which a
case is proved, throws them into one pot, and calls upon the
expert witness for his opinion.
At times it can be the only vehicle of examining the expert,
particularly one who had never had any contact with the par-
ticular subject matter. In one case 48 the facts as to the plaintiff's
condition of ill being were developed by the testimony of non-
expert witnesses and then medical witnesses were called and in
response to a hypothetical question gave their opinion as to a
causal connection between the injury and the condition of ill
being-a method which was approved.
The effectiveness of this vehicle of proof cannot be over-
estimated when we remember that in giving his reasons the wit-
ness can in effect make an argument.
But there is more. Many cases would fail and justice would
frequently be denied without this vehicle. In many instances the
expert has no direct knowledge of the particular subject of the
question. Consider a structure which has been destroyed by fire,
leaving no drawings of any kind. However, there is proof as to
how the fire proceeded, such as roaring through a stair well.
Without the expert and the hypothetical question, it would have
been indeed difficult to establish ordinance violations proximately
contributing to the occurrence.49
So also, your problem may be the proof of unseaworthiness
of a vessel made at a given time but later refurbished. Its entire
crew has been drowned and it has never been brought up from
the depths of the waters. Expert testimony is of untold aid
here.50
The hypothetical question, to be free from error, should be
carefully prepared. It should include the necessary facts and at
the same time be as concise as possible. It is a question which
47 See tables and cases on various types of personal injury and death, and
damages, in, Oleck, Cases on Damages, ch. 21, 22 (1962).
48 Lauth v. Chicago Union Traction Co., supra note 14.
49 Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E. 2d 881 (1960).
50 Midwest Towing Co. v. Anderson, 317 F. 2d 270 (7th Cir. 1963).
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requires out-of-court preparation. If you intend to use it, be cer-
tain that you are properly prepared to do so.
Indeed, modern methods should be used whenever they can
aid the truth-seeking process. If they can communicate or
demonstrate certain facts to the jury, such is sufficient reason
for their use.
All oral or written description fades into insignificance when
compared with a photograph. A picture is the greatest of all
descriptive vehicles. A motion picture portrays that which the
still picture cannot, namely, movement.
What reason can there be as to why we should not avail our-
selves of this vital medium of communication? When we go to
court, we do not turn the clock back to 1900. Indeed, if such
were the case, then all photography, and such scientific evidence
as resulting from ballistics, fingerprints and microscopic studies
would never have played any part in a trial. Yet today almost
no case is tried without a visual aid of some character. Re-
member, as the courts have said many times, the general rule is
that whatever tends to prove any material fact is relevant and
competent.
Thus courts are well aware of the advantages of a motion
picture. For illustrative purposes, in an F. E. L. A. case, a rail-
road carpenter lost his fingers on a shaper machine in a planing
mill. A motion picture was admitted to show the operation of
the machine. 51 So also in a contract action by a rider of a trained
horse against a circus, the defendant's contention that the plain-
tiff obtained the contract by fraud was allowed to be refused by
motion pictures demonstrating the plaintiff's ability.52 And, with
regard to damages, motion pictures have been employed to show
the rapid pulsation of a plaintiff's throat when he was unable to
come to court.
53
As if that were not enough, a Circuit Court of Appeals has
held proper the projection of a screen of films showing the plain-
tiff being treated for his injuries. 54
Consider a person with some terrible injury, such as para-
plegia. The jury, of course, has the right to see the effects of the
injury, either on the person of the individual, or, if that cannot
51 Richardson v. Missouri, K. T. R. Co. of Texas, 205 S.W. 2d 819 (Tex.
1947).
52 Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R. I. 162, 192 A. 158 (1937).
53 Rogers v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 86, 286 N.W. 167 (1939).
54 Luther v. Maple, 250 F. 2d 916 (8th Cir. 1958).
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be done discreetly, with photographs. So also can the injured
demonstrate before the jury the effect of the injury upon him.
The rationale of allowing the jury to see the injury and permit-
ting a demonstration by the plaintiff is that these triers of the
facts will have communicated to them the effects of the particular
wrong.
Why, then, should the jury not know the thousand and one
difficulties this paraplegic is subjected to each twenty-four hours
as he goes through the processes of living?
The only possible objection is that the motion pictures might
have been posed. Nonetheless, if the fact of the injury is estab-
lished, the reason for any such objection disappears. Motion
pictures have been used in such cases. We ourselves have never
had an objection sustained after the court had viewed the picture
and there had been undisputed prior proof as to the nature of the
injury.
Some students of the law-and all of us are forever students
-have the false concept that the forces that engulf the lives of
men turn away and pass the courts by in their normal course.
Obviously, that is not true.
Let us say that whenever possible, employ modern aids
which can not only demonstrate but, more important, make
understandable the propositions for which you stand. Surpris-
ingly enough, some research will usually find authority for the
use of these aids.
How do jurors keep track of special damages? Doctors
come in and testify as to the fair value of their bills. Other paid
bills are admitted in evidence. When there are a number of
bills, the jurors cannot keep track of them. Sometimes they con-
fuse testimony concerning the fair value of services rendered
with that of a paid bill and believe that they cannot include the
former in their award. When bills are stipulated to, as is usually
the case, or when there is no conflict as to the fair value of
services rendered, why not list on a sheet of paper which goes to
the jury room these various items?
Certainly, the defendant, if he has stipulated to a bill, could
not complain of this practice, and it makes it possible for the
jury to know exactly what is in the record.
No remarks about the presentation of a case would be mean-
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There has been a tendency in recent years to regard the
summation of counsel as unimportant. This concept is, of course,
consonant with the theory that a trial is no longer an adversary
proceeding, and that litigation more or less determines its own
outcome. With these thoughts, we are in complete disagreement.
A lawsuit, as we have often said, is a drama, cut as it is out
of the cloth of some human passion. Throughout the usual trial,
there is conflict. It may be in the testimony itself. Or, perhaps,
it may be only in inferences to be drawn from facts about which
there is no disagreement. The climax of that conflict is the sum-
mation. What is said and the manner of saying it ofttimes de-
termines the outcome of the case. If that be true, enough empha-
sis cannot be attached to this phase of the proceeding.
Summation is the vehicle through which the advocate dem-
onstrates his powers of persuasion. All that makes a man a
lawyer-his memory, his ability to reason, his capacity of ex-
pression, his subtlety and tact in delicate situations are but part
of the persuasive process.
Thus, are not trial lawyers justly irked at any court who
seeks to unduly circumscribe summation, particularly by time
limitations? Frequently we go through trials with protracted
delays, many unwarranted and unnecessary. Yet when the time
comes for arguments of counsel, the court is "in a hurry." This
is wrong.
A litigant has an absolute right to argue his cause through
his counsel. And such a right is broad and deep. Indeed, one
may arraign the conduct of the parties, impugn or condemn
motives, and comment upon the demeanor and appearance of
witnesses and their credibility. Indeed, the right of argument
within proper bounds is as profound and broad as the learning
of counsel allows.
The injustice wrought by limitation of time for argument
usually affects that litigant having the affirmative of the issue.
Why? It is he who must fuse twelve minds to the same con-
clusions on all issues. That time is required to accomplish this
is obvious from a few considerations.
First, the jurors come to the trial without previous knowl-
edge. They are laymen. They have but a passing encounter with
the evidence. Witnesses cannot repeat their testimony. Thus
jurors frequently do not realize its importance until all the
evidence is in.
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Again, it is the prime function of the advocate to relate
facts to issues. He must, in his argument, define the issues and
not only delineate what facts are material to those issues, but he
must do more. His is the burden of convincing the jurors that
the delineated facts are controlling. In a word, he must, in his
argument, take the issues, and fit the material facts together so
that there emerges an understandable portrait of the particular
lawsuit. This is often a test of real legal craftsmanship.
The advocate's obligation may mean overcoming the per-
sonal prejudices of the twelve citizens. Every man, it must be
remembered-no matter how just is his heart and how strong his
desire to do justice-has certain preconceived ideas about given
propositions. This is what we mean when we use the phrase:
"personal prejudice."
Remember, jurors want to do that which is right. The prime
object of the advocate is to have them believe that the verdict
sought is a just one.
What is the object of any summation? It is, of course, per-
suasion. What is persuasion? This means obtaining the mind of
the juror and making it that of the advocate. If you will accom-
plish this, remember there must first be a well-defined idea in
your mind, and that idea must have shape and form in your own
mind.
Then, too, there must be an adequate communication of
thoughts. The juror does not see the advocate's mind. The
advocate does not see the juror's mind. We rely upon words.
Thus the advocate must not only make noise, but he must learn
the art-and I use the word advisedly-of transmitting those
thoughts through words. Today, more than at any time, is the
public word-conscious. Because of the radio and television, the
vocabulary of the public is perhaps at its apex. Today the man
on the street is familiar with the shades of meaning conveyed by
certain words. Do not misunderstand us to suggest the use of
only simple words. But, as you know, a different meaning can
be conveyed by a simple synonym or colloquialism.
When does one prepare for summation? Does he wait until
all the evidence is in and then determine that which is impor-
tant? Of course not. All cases, we have stated, regardless of
how involved they may appear to be, have but one or two king-
pins upon which they will turn. If, long before the trial starts,
you have determined what those kingpins are, your preparation
of the summation is but a by-product of that determination.
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Thus your summation will be directed to these kingpins, to
the issues for which you have conditioned them throughout the
trial. You will not be confronted with the problem of attempting
to have the jury forget, so to speak, much evidence which had
no importance.
Personally, we like to list the two or three important facts
in the case and try to introduce evidence material to those facts.
The more facts you have as kingpins, the more difficult your
problem becomes.
With reference to physical preparation of your summation,
what is to be done? Shall you write it out in advance and read
it to the jury? Of course not. It would be meaningless. You
would lose that individual contact which comes from eye to eye
contact with the jury. Absent would be the feeling of sincerity
which cannot be conveyed through reading. Remember, unless
you believe that which you say, how can you expect another to
do so?
Should you make an outline of your thoughts and keep that
within reach? Some lawyers do this effectively, and throughout
their argument keep in touch with the jury; or should you make
an outline of your thoughts on a small sheet, and, with your
thoughts thus organized, make no reference to the sheet or to
any document? This, we believe, is the optimum method. Why?
You can look at each juror, eye to eye, and, without interruption,
demonstrate your own belief in what you say. Then, too, you can
at times feel the reaction of the jury to what you are saying. If
a particular approach seems obviously unimpressive, you can
abandon it. Above all, you will be able to better feel the pulse
of the jury and keep it throbbing with your own.
What is the form of your argument? All lawyers have cer-
tain methods of arguing. But, regardless of whom you represent,
we believe that there are two phases which must be discussed.
The role of the jury should be described. The jury must be
made conscious of the delicate ground it occupies, the power it
possesses and our reason for juries. It should know that trial by
jury has as its predominant characteristic the resolution of all
problems we call lawsuits in an almost sacrosanct climate.
The techniques counsel employ for this purpose vary. They
are immaterial so long as they serve the purpose. Some do so at
the outset of the summation-others at the close. Again, many
remind the jury of its part in the trial both at the beginning and
at the end of their summations.
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Secondly, the law governing the rights and liabilities of the
parties must be dilated upon. An adequate discussion of the law
gives meaning to your dissertation of the facts. In addition to
that, it conditions the jury for the court's charge. It is our
opinion that a jury argument is not comprehensible unless it is
preceded by some discussion of the law pertinent to the case.
Thus consider an action under the Federal Safety Appliance
Statute, wherein the only issues are whether there was a viola-
tion and whether that violation proximately contributed to the
alleged injury. There is no question of negligence; there is no
issue of misconduct on the part of the employee. Unless the
jury knows something about that law, how could they understand
your discussion of the facts? Again, let us suppose a defendant
is defending a case solely on the basis of contributory negligence.
The jury must know that if the plaintiff was guilty of any negli-
gence which proximately caused the injury, he cannot recover,
regardless of how negligent the defendant might have been.
We cannot overstress these two thoughts: First, never be
an imitator, but insist upon being yourself, and secondly, ap-
proach your discussion of the case in a realistic manner so that
you can expect others to adopt the reasons for the proposition
for which you contend.
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